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Abstract 
We empirically investigate whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt 
markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To do so, we examine the behaviour of 
EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund for a sample of both central 
and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012. First we apply a dynamic approach 
to analyse the evolution of the degree of Granger-causality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond 
yield spreads in our sample, in order to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between 
them (which we associate with contagion) and episodes of significantly reduced interconnection 
(which we associate with immunisation). We then use an ordered logit model to assess the 
determinants of the occurrence of the episodes detected. Our results suggest the importance of 
variables proxying market sentiment and of variables proxying macrofundamentals in determining 
contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, our findings underline the coexistence of “pure” 
and “fundamentals-based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The announcement of Greece’s distressed debt position in late 2009 triggered a sudden loss of 
investor confidence and marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, in 
May 2010 Greece’s financial problems became so severe that the country needed to be bailed 
out. An important reason for providing financial support to Greece was fear of contagion (see, 
for instance, Constâncio, 2012), not only because several European Union banks had a high 
exposure to Greece (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013a), but also because the 
investors now turned their attention to the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries, which had largely been ignored 
until then (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). So, from late 2009 onwards, in parallel with the 
higher demand for the German bund which benefited from its safe haven status, yield spreads 
of euro area issues with respect to Germany spiralled (see Figure 1). Besides, since May 2010, 
not only has Greece been rescued twice, but also Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus have needed 
bailouts to stay afloat.  
 
These events raised some important questions for economists, policymakers, and practitioners. 
To what extent was the sovereign risk premium increase in the euro area during the European 
sovereign debt crisis due only to deteriorated debt sustainability in member countries? Did 
contagion play any significant role in the increase in the sovereign risk premium? In fact the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe has rekindled the literature on contagion applied to the euro 
area [see Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and 
Fratzscher (2013) and Mink and Haan (2013) to name a few], even though the empirical 
evidence is not conclusive. The discrepancies and inconsistencies between studies using 
different empirical approaches and applying different definitions of the crisis transmission 
channel have made it difficult to compare results and therefore to reach meaningful 
conclusions (Dungey et al., 2005). The main objective of this paper is to shed some light on this 
challenging avenue of research. 
 
The first challenge is to provide a precise definition of contagion, since at present the term is 
used quite ambiguously in the literature. Nor is there any agreement on the econometric 
methodology to be used. So, the second challenge is an empirical one: contagion is an 
unobservable shock, and therefore most empirical techniques have problems dealing with 
latent variables. 
 
In this paper, in order to evaluate the extent of contagion in the euro area, we first test for the 
existence of possible Granger-causal relationships between 10-year sovereign yield spreads over 
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Germany of 10 EMU countries, both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and The 
Netherlands) and peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Secondly, we examine 
the time-varying nature of these relationships in order to detect episodes of significant 
intensification or reduction in the causality between them. Finally, we explore whether there is 
evidence of “pure contagion” or “fundamentals-based contagion” in the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis, by trying to determine which factors (changes in local risk sentiment in each 
different country, fundamental variables, financial linkages, or common regional/global risk 
factors) might have been behind these intensification/reduction episodes.   
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on financial 
contagion and on the determinants of euro-area sovereign bond spreads. The Granger-causality 
analysis and our approach for the detection of episodes of intensification/reduction of causality 
are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we carry out the empirical exploration of the 
determinants of these episodes. Finally, Section 5 summarises the findings and offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature review  
2. 1. Financial contagion   
  
Considerable ambiguity surrounds the precise definition of contagion. There is no theoretical 
or empirical definition on which all researchers agree; therefore, the debate on exactly how to 
define contagion is not just academic, but has important implications for measuring the 
concept and for evaluating policy responses. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) note five definitions of 
contagion used in the literature, whilst The World Bank defines three layers within contagion1. 
First, in a broad sense, contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or general cross-
country spillover effects; in this sense, contagion can take place both during “good” and “bad” 
times and does not need to be related to crises. Second, in a restrictive sense, contagion is the 
transmission of shocks to other countries, or the cross-country correlation, beyond any 
fundamental link2 between the countries and beyond common shocks. When either 
fundamentals or common shocks do not fully explain the relationship between countries, 
spillover effects are attributed to herding behaviour, either rational or irrational. Finally, in a 
                                                          
1http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0 
2
 The World Bank distinguishes three different categories of fundamental links: financial, real, and political. The first ones exist when two 
economies are connected through the international financial system. Real links are fundamental economic relationships between 
countries. These links have usually been associated with international trade, but other types of real links, like foreign direct investment 
across countries, may also be present. Finally, political links are the political relationships between countries. Although this link is much 
less stressed in the literature, when a group of countries share an exchange rate arrangement – a common currency in the case of the euro 
area countries – crises tend to be clustered. 
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very restrictive sense, according to the World Bank, contagion refers to increases in cross-
country correlations during “crisis times” relative to correlations during “tranquil times”.  
 
The second and third definitions of contagion proposed by the World Bank (contagion in a 
restrictive, and in a very restrictive sense) have predominantly been used in empirical studies 
analysing the concept in financial markets and have been adopted in common usage by 
governments, citizens and policymakers. The third defines contagion depending on whether 
the transmission mechanisms are stable through time, whilst the second defines it depending 
on the channels of transmission that are used to spread the effects of the crisis.  
 
According to the very restrictive definition, which was proposed in a seminal paper by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002), contagion is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to 
one country (or group of countries). Therefore, if two markets show a high degree of co-
movement during periods of stability, even if they continue to be highly correlated after a 
shock to one market this may not constitute contagion. This definition implies the presence of 
a tranquil, pre-crisis period. The distinction between contagion which occurs at times of crisis, 
and the interdependence which is the result of normal market interaction, has become the focal 
point of many contagion studies (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 2005 or Bae et al., 2003). 
 
By contrast, Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Masson (1999), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
explore the restrictive definition of contagion, arguing that contagion arises when common 
shocks and all channels of potential interconnection are either not present or have been 
controlled for. According to these authors, “pure or true contagion” should be distinguished 
from “fundamentals-based contagion” which is caused by “monsoonal effects” and “linkages”. 
“Monsoonal effects” are random aggregate shocks that hit a number of countries in a similar 
way (such as a major economic shift in industrial countries, a significant change in oil prices or 
changes in US interest rates) that may adversely affect the economic fundamentals of several 
economies simultaneously and, therefore, may cause a crisis (Eichengreen et. al., 1996). 
“Linkages” are normal interdependencies, such as those produced by trade and financial 
relations between countries and which can easily become a carrier of crisis (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000).  
 
Conversely, the term “pure contagion” is only applied when the transmission process itself 
changes when entering crisis periods: when a crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a 
crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals – perhaps because it 
leads to shifts in market sentiment, or changes the interpretation given to existing information, 
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or triggers herding behaviour (Claessens et al., 2001). Different mechanisms have been 
proposed to explain herding behaviour by international investors and other cases of extreme 
market sentiment (see Lux, 1995; or Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). The literature has emphasised 
that asymmetric information is at the root of these market reactions. Information is costly, so 
investors do not know enough about the countries in which they invest and therefore try to 
infer future price changes based on how the rest of the market is reacting. The relatively 
uninformed investors follow the supposedly informed investors, and all the market moves 
jointly.  
 
All in all, then, the literature includes two groups of theories (not necessarily mutually exclusive 
– see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013) to explain crisis transmission mechanisms. One group argues 
that the economic fundamentals of different countries are interconnected by their cross-border 
flows of goods, services, and capital. When a crisis originates in one country, this 
interdependence of economies through real and financial linkages may become a conveyor of 
crisis. In addition, global phenomena or common shocks may adversely affect the economic 
fundamentals of several economies simultaneously, and may therefore cause a crisis. These 
fundamentals-based effects are also known as ‘spillovers’ (Masson, 1999), ‘interdependence’ 
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or ‘fundamentals-based contagion’ (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
2000).  
 
The other group of theories argues that financial crisis spreads from one country to another 
due to market imperfection or the behaviour of international investors (Masson, 1999). 
Information asymmetries make investors more uncertain about the actual economic 
fundamentals of a country. A crisis in one country may give a “wake-up call” to international 
investors to reassess the risks in other countries; uninformed or less informed investors may 
find it difficult to extract the informed signal from the falling price and follow the strategies of 
better informed investors, thus generating excess co-movements across the markets. The 
degree of non-anticipation of a crisis by investors or sudden shifts in market confidence and 
expectations have been identified as important factors causing “pure contagion” (see Masson, 
1999 and Mondria and Quintana-Domeque, 2013). 
 
The initial empirical literature on financial crisis and contagion was focused on fundamentals-
based mechanisms and directed towards developing an early warning system (Eichengreen et 
al., 1996; Kaminsky et al., 2000) while later empirical works have focused on investor 
behaviour-based mechanisms (Dungey et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2011). The aim of this paper is 
to explore the extent to which the transmission of euro area debt crisis could be attributed to 
  
7
common shocks and/or interconnected markets (through real and financial linkages), to 
idiosyncratic factors (shifts in market participants behaviour during the crisis period), or to 
both types of factor. To this end, we will analyse which variables could be behind the crisis 
transmission in order to assess whether there is empirical evidence of “fundamentals-based 
contagion”, or “pure contagion”, or of a mixture of the two during the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis. 
 
In addition, among the five general strategies3 that have been used in the empirical literature, 
our analysis will be related to one of the most conventional methodologies for testing for 
contagion: the analysis of cross-market correlations. However, we not only investigate changes 
in cross-market interdependencies via cointegration analysis, but also explore changes in the 
existence and direction of pair-wise causal relationships among euro area sovereign bond yield 
spreads vis-à-vis the German bund4. Hence, the two operational definitions of contagion that 
we will explore in the remainder of this paper are the following. We will identify 
“fundamentals-based contagion” as an abnormal increase in the intensity of causal relationships 
explained by macroeconomic fundamentals, financial linkages or common regional/global 
shocks, and “pure contagion” as an abnormal increase in the intensity of causal relationships 
only triggered by a shift in idiosyncratic market sentiments.  
 
2.2. Determinants of the evolution of euro-area sovereign yield spreads. 
 
In order to analyse the factors behind episodes of intensification/reduction of causality within 
sovereign yield spreads, we focused on the literature on the determinants of the evolution of 
euro-area sovereign yield spread. This literature, combined with that of financial contagion, 
suggests that we should not only include variables that measure macroeconomic fundamentals 
or some potential channels of crisis transmission, but also those that capture changes in market 
sentiment: either idiosyncratic, regional, or global5. A summary with the definition and sources 
of all the explanatory variables used in the ordered logit model is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Specifically, four variables have been used to gauge regional, global or local market sentiment in 
each different country: stock returns, stock volatility, an index of economic policy uncertainty, 
and an index of the fiscal stance.  
                                                          
3
 Probability analysis, cross-market correlations, VAR models, latent factor/GARCH models, and extreme value/co-exceedance/jump 
approach (see Forbes, 2013). 
4
 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest the use of this methodology and note that, if the source of the crisis is not well identified and 
endogeneity may be severe, it may be useful to utilise Granger-causality tests to determine the extent of any feedback from each country 
in the sample to the initial crisis country. 
5 We expect the same sign for the effect of each of these variables on spreads and on the occurrence of a contagion episode. 
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Monthly stock returns are used in order to reflect portfolio allocation effects between stocks 
and bonds in each country (see among others, Aizenman, 2013 and Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 
2013). Since periods of financial turmoil and negative stock returns may be accompanied by 
rises in sovereign bond spreads because of an increased propensity to hold safer assets (the 
German bund in our case), we expect a negative association between them. To this end, 
differences of logged stock index prices of the last and the first day of the month have been 
calculated for the benchmark stock index in each country; whilst the Eurostoxx-50 and the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 have been used to calculate, respectively, the evolution of regional and 
global stock returns. Volatility is a measure of the level of uncertainty prevailing in stock 
markets. Two different approaches are used to estimate it; while historical volatility involves 
measuring the standard deviation of closing returns for any particular security over a given 
period of time, implied volatility is derived from option prices. The latter represents the 
estimates and assumptions of market participants involved in a trade, on the basis of a given 
option price, and has been used to gauge both regional and global stock market volatility. In 
particular, the variables VSTOXX and VIX which measure implied volatility in Eurostoxx-50 
and Standard and Poor’s 500 index options and have been widely used in the literature by other 
authors (see, e.g., Afonso, 2012, Aizenman et al., 2013, and Battistini et al., 2013) have been 
incorporated as measures of uncertainty in the Eurozone and the global financial markets 
respectively. However, since the implied volatility indices were not available for all countries, 
we opted for the monthly standard deviation of equity returns in each country to capture local 
stock market volatility. The increased stock market volatility is usually accompanied by an 
increase in other risk components and, thus, leads to increases in bond yield spreads; as a 
result, we expect a positive sign for the respective coefficient.  
 
Some authors (see, e.g. Ades and Chua, 1993) find that political instability has strong negative 
effects on a country’s per capita growth rate. Thus, to assess whether policy uncertainty has an 
influence on the decisions of bond market investors, we have used the index of economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU), built up by Baker et. al. (2013), which draws on the frequency of 
newspaper references to policy uncertainty and other indicators and which is available for 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Europe and the United States. A positive sign is also expected 
for the respective coefficient since policy uncertainty may discourage investments in sovereign 
debt markets. A related question is the analysis of the impact of the fiscal stance of each 
country on sovereign debt spreads. Therefore, the index of the fiscal stance suggested by Polito 
and Wickens (2011, 2012) is also included in the analysis. Unlike the standard econometric tests 
of fiscal sustainability, this index is suitable for assessing fiscal policy in the short and medium 
term as it can measure the fiscal consolidation needed to achieve a pre-specified debt target at 
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any future time horizon. To capture regional and global risk we have used the European and 
United States indices of the fiscal stance respectively. Since, by construction, the higher the 
index, the worse the fiscal stance, we expect a positive sign for its coefficient.  
 
Another variable, the consumer confidence indicator6, has been used to measure either regional 
(Eurozone) or local market sentiment in each different country. This index is used to gauge 
economic agents’ perceptions of future economic activity and it seems reasonable to expect a 
negative relationship between it and spreads, since an increase in consumer confidence may 
lead to a rise in investor confidence in the economy’s potential for growth.  
 
Finally, the analysis of the influence of local, regional and global market sentiment on sovereign 
yield spreads has been completed by the inclusion of one more variable in the first case, five 
additional variables in the second, and two supplementary variables in the third.  
 
Credit rating has been included as a proxy of the market perception of default risk in each local 
market. So, following Blanco (2001), we built up a monthly scale to estimate the effect of 
investor sentiment based on the rating offered by the three most important agencies (Standard 
&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). Since this variable is considered an ex post measure of fiscal 
sustainability it should have a positive impact on sovereign spreads (by construction, the higher 
the scale, the worse the rating categories). 
 
Five variables have been added to explore the impact of regional market sentiment on 
sovereign spreads. First, we have accounted for the effects of the prevailing credit risk 
conditions in the European corporate bond market. Following Georgoutsos and Migiakis 
(2013), the indices (iBoxx) of European corporate bonds with a rating of BBB have been used 
in order to obtain the spread between their yields, since they are commonly used as a proxy of 
the effects that changes in credit risk conditions in the European corporate bond market 
exercise on European sovereign bond spreads. Furthermore, to capture the full spectrum of 
credit quality in the euro area corporate market, we have also included the evolution of two 
indices: the ITRAXXFIN and the ITRAXXNF. These are European 5-year CDS indices in the 
financial and the non-financial sector respectively (the corresponding indices for the United 
States have been widely used in the literature: see, for instance, Gilchrist et. al., 2013). 
                                                          
6 According to some authors (see, e.g., Rua, 2002), the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) has informative content for the GDP 
growth rate and can therefore be used to gauge economic agents’ perceptions of future economic activity. However, since this indicator 
was not available for Ireland, and the correlation between the Consumer Confidence Indicator and the ESI is very high, we decided to 
include the former in the analysis.  
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Considering the ‘‘safe haven’’ status of the German bund, we expect these two variables, which 
measure credit risk in the corporate bond market, to be positively related to the spreads. 
 
Moreover, one- and ten-year interest rate volatility indices for the Eurozone (EIRVIXs) based 
on the implied volatility quotes of caps (floors) – one of the most liquid interest rate 
derivatives, constructed by López and Navarro (2013) – have also been incorporated in the 
analysis. A positive sign is also expected for these variables, since increased interest rate 
volatility is usually accompanied by an increase in yield spread volatility. To account for the 
concerns for the stability of the euro we have used the indicator built up by Klose and Weigert 
(2012) which reflects the market expectation of the probability that at least one euro area 
country will have left the currency union by the end of 2013. Finally, to measure the joint 
default risk in the euro area, we include the time-varying probability of two or more credit 
events (out of ten) over a one-year horizon calculated by Lucas et al. (2013). A positive 
relationship is also expected between the last two variables (which measure uncertainty and 
default risk in the euro area) and sovereign yield spreads.  
 
As mentioned, two supplementary variables have also been introduced in the model in order to 
assess global market risk aversion. Firstly, following the empirical literature on sovereign bond 
spreads in emerging markets, which shows that yields on US government bonds are the main 
determinants of sovereign spreads, the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps 
and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds is also introduced as a 
proxy of international risk factors (see Codogno et al., 2003 and Gómez-Puig, 2008). Secondly, 
we have included the Kansas City Financial Stress Index built by Hakkio and Keeton (2009), 
which is a monthly measure of stress in the U.S. financial system based on 11 financial market 
variables (a positive value indicates that financial stress is above the long-run average, while a 
negative value signifies that financial stress is below the long-run average). Therefore, a positive 
relationship is also expected between these two variables and sovereign spreads. 
 
On the other hand, in order to measure the impact of fundamental variables (at both the local 
and the regional level) on sovereign spreads behaviour, we use instruments that gauge not only 
each country’s fiscal position, but the market liquidity in each country, its foreign debt, its  
potential rate of growth, and the loss of competitiveness as well. The private sector level of 
indebtedness has been added in the analysis of the effect of local fundamental variables and, 
finally, we have included foreign claims on sectoral private debt and cross-border banking 
system linkages as measures of the degree of crisis transmission through the financial system 
(see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013a).  
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Specifically, the variables used to measure the country’s fiscal position are the government 
debt-to-GDP and the government deficit-to-GDP. These two variables have been widely used 
in the literature by other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 1995) and present an advantage over 
the credit rating in that they cannot be considered ex post measures of fiscal sustainability. Since 
they are measures of credit risk, they should be directly related with sovereign spreads increase.  
 
Regarding the liquidity premium in each sovereign debt market, empirical papers examining the 
influence of market liquidity in bond markets use a variety of measures to gauge its three main 
dimensions of tightness, depth and resiliency. These measures include trading volume, bid-ask 
spreads, the outstanding amount of debt securities, and the issue size of the specific bond. 
However, several studies have shown that all liquidity measures are closely related to each other 
[Gómez-Puig (2006), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and Gerlach et al. (2010) to name a few]. 
Therefore, we think that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt – which is 
considered a measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information 
costs as their securities are likely to trade frequently, and a relatively large number of investors 
may own or may have analysed their features – might be a good proxy of liquidity differences 
between markets. Since liquidity premium decreases with market size, we would expect a 
negative effect of this variable on sovereign spreads. 
 
Besides, the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio is the instrument used as a proxy of the 
foreign debt and the net position of the country vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Note that this 
variable is defined as the difference between exports and imports. Therefore an increase would 
signal an improvement in the net position of the country towards the rest of the world, 
reducing sovereign spreads. The importance of this variable has been underlined by the IMF 
(2010) and Barrios et al. (2009). In view of Mody (2009)’s argument that countries’ sensitivity to 
the financial crisis is more pronounced the greater the loss of their growth potential and 
competitiveness, we include instruments that measure these features. The unemployment rate 
is the variable used to capture the country’s growth potential, whilst the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices monthly interannual rate of growth is the inflation rate measure we use as a 
proxy of the appreciation of the real exchange rate and, thus, the country’s loss of 
competitiveness. An increase in either unemployment or inflation represents a deterioration of 
growth potential and competitiveness; so, it should augment sovereign spreads.   
 
To assess the role of private debt in the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we also incorporate 
instruments that capture the level of indebtedness of each country’s private sector in the 
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analysis. To that end, we make use of a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector in 
each EMU country. In particular, we use three variables: banks’ debt-to-GDP, non-financial 
corporations’ debt-to-GDP, and households’ debt-to-GDP, which have been constructed with 
data obtained from the European Central Bank Statistics. Since high leverage levels in the 
private sector have a negative impact on the public sector’s sustainability, an increase in these 
three variables would positively affect sovereign yield spreads.   
 
Finally, according to certain authors [Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011) among 
them], in a scenario of increased international financial activity in the euro area, not only are 
public finance imbalances key determinants of the probability that the sovereign debt crisis 
could spill over from one country to another, but the transmission of the crisis through the 
banking system can also be a major issue. As a result, in our analysis we also include variables 
that capture the important cross-border banking system linkages in euro area countries. These 
linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the public, banking and non-financial 
private sectors as a proportion of GDP. Moreover, we also explore the role of consolidated 
claims on an immediate borrower basis provided by BIS by nationality of reporting banks as a 
proportion of total foreign claims on each country. We expect that higher banking sector 
exposure and cross-border banking system linkages will be associated with an increase in 
sovereign spreads7.  
 
3. Granger-causality analysis 
3. 1. Econometric strategy 
 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and is 
widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The central 
notion is one of predictability (Hoover, 2001): a variable Y is said to Granger-cause another 
variable X if past values of Y help predict the current level of X better than past values of X 
alone, indicating that past values of Y have some informational content that is not present in 
past values of X. Therefore, knowledge of the evolution of the variable Y reduces the forecast 
errors of the variable X, suggesting that X does not evolve independently of Y.  
 
                                                          
7 The construction and evolution of sectoral private debt, foreign banks claims by sector and by nationality of reporting banks are 
explained in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013a). 
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Tests of Granger causality typically use the same lags for all variables. This poses a potential 
problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length8. In determining the optimal 
lag structure for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) sequential method to test for causality, 
which combines Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of 
Granger-causality9. Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias that arises from under-
parameterisation of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting from its over-parameterisation, 
removing the ambiguities of the conventional procedure.  
 
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X Xα δ ε
−
=
= + +∑                   (1) 
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Yα δ γ ε
− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑                                  (2)       
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps are 
used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m10. Choose the order which yields the smallest 
FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated 
variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order of lags of Yt from 
1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)11. 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) with 
the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt. 
If FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are I(1) 
variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the existence of 
                                                          
8
 The general principle is that smaller lag lengths have smaller variance but run a risk of bias, while larger lags reduce the bias problem 
but may lead to inefficiency. 
9 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
10 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1X
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
+ +
=
− −
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the 
sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
11 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1X
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
+ + +
=
− − −
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the following error 
correction models: 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X Xα δ ε
−
=
∆ = + ∆ +∑                                  (3) 
        0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Yα β δ γ ε
− − −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑          (4) 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tX Yµ λ= + ), known as the 
error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) variables, but they are not cointegrated, 
then β in (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can use 
Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), as well 
as substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this way, we 
ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and Mizon, 1999). 
 
3. 2. Data  
 
The dependent variables in our empirical analysis are bond yield spreads, derived as differences 
between 10-year sovereign bond yields of EMU-founding countries and Greece and yields of 
the equivalent German bund. Therefore, our sample contains both central (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) 12. 
 
We use daily data from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2012 collected from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Figure 1 plots the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign bond spreads for each 
country in our sample. A simple look at this figure indicates the differences in the yield 
behaviour before and after the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis at the end of 2009.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Specifically, it is striking that between the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and 
November 2009, when it became clear that the Greek economy faced the bleak reality of being 
unable to finance its sovereign debt, spreads on bonds of EMU countries moved in a narrow 
range with only slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the stability and convergence of 
                                                          
12
 Luxembourg is exempted from the present analysis, because of its very low level of outstanding sovereign bonds. 
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spreads was considered a hallmark of successful financial integration inside the euro area 
(neither the subprime crisis nor the Lehman Brothers collapse bit significantly into euro 
sovereign spreads). 
 
Nevertheless, once the global financial crisis began to affect the real sector, the imbalances 
within euro area countries were plain to see. Spreads, which had reached levels close to zero 
between the launch of the euro and October 2009 (the average value of the 10-year yield spread 
against the German bund moved between 10 and 47 basis points in the case of France and 
Greece respectively), have risen ever since. Indeed, the risk premium on EMU government 
bonds increased strongly from November 2009, reflecting investor perceptions of upcoming 
risks. Figure 1 shows that by late 2011 and beginning 2012 it reached maximum levels of 4680 
basis points in Greece, 1141 in Portugal, 1125 in Ireland, 635 in Spain and 550 in Italy. This 
widespread increase in sovereign spreads meant that certain euro area Member States were 
under enormous pressure to finance their debt, and funding costs rose significantly. This led to 
an increase in rollover risk as debt had to be refinanced at unusually high costs and, in extreme 
cases, could not be rolled over at all, which triggered the need for a rescue (see Caceres, 2010). 
 
3.3. Preliminary results 
 
As a first step, we tested the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and Chinn (1997)’s suggestion, 
we confirmed the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a 
stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. The results, not shown here to save 
space but available from the authors upon request, decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity in the first regressions. They do not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in first 
differences, but strongly reject it in levels, in the second ones. So, they suggest that both 
variables can be treated as first-difference stationary. 
 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 45 pair combinations13 of 
EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest14 that only for the 
Greece-Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases does the trace test indicate the existence of one 
cointegrating equation at (at least) the 0.05 level. Therefore, for these two pairs we test for 
Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with an error-correction term added [i. e., 
                                                          
13 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of ten EMU yield spreads with respect to Germany is given by the 
following formula ! 10! 45.
!( )! 2!(10 2)!
n
r n r
= =
− −
 
14
 Again, the results are not presented in the interests of space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-causality in first 
differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4) 
with β=0] 
 
3.4. Empirical results 
 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample suggest bidirectional Granger-causality in 
almost all cases15. However, there are some exceptions. We do not find unidirectional Granger-
causality in the relationships running from Austria to Ireland, from Finland to France, from 
France to Ireland and from Greece to Ireland. Nor do we find bidirectional Granger-causality 
relationships between Austria and Portugal, or between Finland and Greece. However, in order 
to assess the dynamic Granger-causality between the 90 possible EMU yield spreads 
relationships, we carried out 309,500 rolling regressions using a window of 200 observations16. 
In each estimation, we apply Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined above to determine 
the optimum FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case. We find sub-periods of 
Granger-causality in all pair-wise relationships, even for those relationships where we found 
rejection when performing the tests for the whole sample. 
 
After examining the time-varying nature of causal relationships, we proceed further by 
identifying sub-periods of significant increase/decrease in Granger-causality in order to identify 
the factors that may have been behind them. To this end, we identify episodes of Granger-
causality intensification such as those in which the time-varying Granger-causality indicator is 
greater than its average plus two standard errors17. Therefore, we look for episodes where there 
is evidence of an enhancement in the information content of the yield spread series that 
significantly improves the explanatory power of the future evolution of the other yield spread 
series, suggesting a strengthening of their interdependence. Likewise, we identify episodes of 
reduction in the interconnection between the series under study as those in which the time-
varying Granger-causality indicator is lower than its average minus two standard errors. Hence, 
in this latter case, we search for episodes where there is evidence that the information content 
of the yield spread series significantly reduces the explanatory power of future evolution of the 
                                                          
15
 These results are also available from the authors upon request. The results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint 
hypothesis 
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0nγ γ γ= = = =  in equations (2) or (4) and the Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959).   
16 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to set the optimal window size. The chosen value of 200 observations is 
representative of the one used in practice and seems appropriate for our empirical application since it represents 6.36% of the sample. 
We have also used a value of 100 observations. The results (not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request) 
render the same qualitative conclusions as when 200 observations were used. 
17 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have the same mean during the detected episodes and the rest of the 
observations. The results of these tests (not shown here, but available from the authors upon request) strongly reject the null hypothesis 
of equal mean across sub-samples, and provide additional support for the presence of increased Granger-causality. 
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other yield spread series18. We associate episodes of Granger-causality intensification with 
episodes of contagion, and episodes of causality reduction with episodes of immunisation19. 
 
The graphs in Figures 2 suggest that these episodes are concentrated around the first year of 
the existence of the EMU in 1999, the introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 2002, and 
the global financial crisis of the late 2000s. Specifically, Figures 2a to 2e represent the time-
varying evolution of these intensification/reduction episodes within all EMU countries (Figure 
2a), within peripheral countries (Figure 2b), from peripheral to central countries (Figure 2c), 
within central countries (Figure 2d), and from central to peripheral countries (Figure 2e). All in 
all, contagion episodes more than triple immunisation ones and register a significant increase 
coinciding with the recent crisis in sovereign debt markets from 2009 onwards, providing 
evidence of a reinforcement of the interconnection between debt markets. It is also notable 
that whilst contagion episodes are more frequent when the triggering countries in the causal 
relationships are peripheral (57% of the total, see Figures 2b and 2c), immunisation episodes 
are more usual when central countries are the triggers (65% of the total, see Figures 2d and 2e).  
 
[Insert Figures 2 here] 
 
4. Determinants of episodes of Granger-causality intensification/reduction 
4.1. Econometric methodology  
Once the episodes of intensification/reduction have been detected, we use ordered logit 
models to analyse their determinants. We define a new dependent variable (y) that takes the 
value 1 if we have detected an episode of Granger-causality reduction, 2 if there is no evidence 
of reduction or intensification (i. e., a “normal” relationship), and 3 if we have found a episode 
of intensification.  
 
The ordered logit model is based on a continuous latent variable specified as: 
                  * 'it it ity x uβ= +                                                    (5) 
where *ity measures the degree of interconnection between EMU yield spreads, itx  is a vector 
of explanatory variables20, β  is an unknown parameter vector and uit
  
is the error term, which is 
assumed to follow a standard logistic distribution. In (5) the index i (i=1, ...., N) denotes the 
                                                          
18 Indeed, the manipulated variable in equations (2) or (4) not only does not contribute to a better prediction of the controlled variable, 
but its inclusion actually renders the prediction worse, signaling that its information content is not relevant for the future evolution of the 
manipulated variable. 
19 Using the framework for grading the strength of the Granger-causality relationship proposed by Atukeren (2005) we obtain the same 
classification of episodes of intensification and reduction. Atukeren (2005)’s framework uses Postkitt and Tremayne (1987)’s posterior 
odds ratio test and Jeffreys (1961)’s Bayesian concept of grades of evidence. 
20 The regressors are listed in Appendix A. No intercept is included. 
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country pair and the index t (t=1, ...., T) indicates the period21. Unfortunately, *ity  is an 
unobserved variable. Let us assume that ity is the observed discrete variable that reflects the 
different degrees of interrelationship for EMU country pair i at time t. The relationship 
between the latent variable and the observed discrete one will be obtained from the model 
according to 
ity =1 if 
*
1,ity µ−∞ < ≤  i=1, ...., N 
ity =2 if 
*
1 2 ,ityµ µ< ≤  i=1, ...., N 
ity =3 if 
*
2 ,ityµ ≤ < +∞  i=1, ...., N 
where 1µ  and 2µ  denote the threshold points that must satisfy that  1µ < 2.µ  Then  
1
1Pr( 1)
1 exp( ' )it it
y
xµ β= = + −  
2 1
1 1Pr( 2)
1 exp( ' ) 1 exp( ' )it it it
y
x xµ β µ β= = −+ − + −  
2
1Pr( 3) 1
1 exp( ' )it it
y
xµ β= = − + −  
 
4.2. Empirical evidence 
 
Given that the instruments used as independent variables have been constructed with a 
monthly frequency, we also need to compute the dependent variable in the ordered logit 
models on a monthly basis. We calculate the monthly data by assigning a value of 1 if at least 
for half of the month there is evidence of reduction in the interconnection between yield 
spreads, a value of 3 if at least for half of the month there is evidence of Granger-causality 
intensification, and a value of 2 if at least for half of the month there is no evidence of either 
intensification or reduction. 
 
We follow the general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995): our empirical analysis starts with a 
general unrestricted statistical model including all explanatory variables to capture the essential 
characteristics of the underlying dataset, testing it down by eliminating statistically insignificant 
variables, and checking the validity of the reductions at each stage to ensure congruence of the 
finally selected model22. We have also considered the possibility of both individual-specific 
                                                          
21 As we will see in Section 4.2, in our case N=90 (the number of pair-wise relationships between sovereign bond yield spreads) and 
T=168 (monthly observations for 14 years). 
22 Note that this commonly used approach is a process driven by the data. We have also explored the possibility of adopting an 
alternative theory-driven approach using a specific-to-general modeling process by estimating equation (5) with each potential category of 
determinants having only one representative variable, leading to a multiplicity of models by the successive incorporation of additional 
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effects (in each pair-wise relationship) and time-specific effects, by incorporating dummy 
variables, testing the joint significance of these dummies separately and once they are taken 
together. In Table 1 we report the final results of the ordered logit models estimated by 
maximum likelihood for five groups of countries: the first correspond to 
intensification/reduction causal relationship episodes within pairs of all EMU countries, the 
second within pairs of peripheral countries, the third from peripheral to central countries, the 
fourth within central countries, and lastly, the fifth from central to peripheral countries23. The 
z-statistics in that table are based on robust standard errors computed using the Huber-White 
quasi-maximum likelihood method. As can be seen, all the estimated coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level, and the individual and time dummies are jointly significant for the relationships 
between yield spreads in central countries, in peripheral countries and in those from peripheral 
to central countries, while for the relationships within all country pairs and those from central 
to peripheral countries we only find that the individual dummies are statistically significant. 
 
The sign of the regression parameters can be immediately interpreted as determining whether 
the latent variable increases with the regressor. As can be seen, most of the estimated 
coefficients are positive, suggesting that an increase in the variable necessarily decreases the 
probability of being in the lowest category ( ity =1, i. e., immunisation) and increases the 
probability of being in the highest category ( ity =3, i. e., contagion). The converse is true for 
the negative sign coefficients associated with the consumer confidence indicator, the net 
position towards the rest of the world, and the market liquidity24. 
 
The empirical evidence presented in Table 1 does not support the occurrence of either 
“fundamentals-based” or “pure” contagion in euro area countries, but it suggests that a mixture 
of the two might have taken place. Specifically, when examining all pair-wise relationships, we 
find that not only some of the variables which capture both local and regional market 
sentiment are statistically significant, but that some local macroeconomic variables together 
with the instrument which gauges financial linkages are also relevant.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
variables. Interestingly, this alternative approach that explicitly acknowledges that there may be several models that are generated by the 
same data set (Hendry, 1995, 501) renders final specifications that are very close to the one obtained from the general-to-specific 
approach, giving further support to our results. 
23 All estimated threshold parameters differ significantly from each other, justifying our use of the ordered logit model since it indicates 
that the three categories should not be collapsed into two categories.   
24 Recall that an increase in consumer confidence may lead to a rise in investor confidence, so it seems reasonable to expect a negative 
relationship between it and the probability of occurrence of a contagion episode. Regarding the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio, 
which is the instrument used as a proxy of the net position of the country towards the rest of the world, since this variable is defined as 
the difference between exports and imports an increase would have a negative effect on the probability of contagion. Finally, given that 
our measure of market liquidity is the overall amount of outstanding debt and that liquidity premium decreases with market size, one 
would expect a negative impact between this variable and contagion.  
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These findings are in line with the literature that states that the two types of contagion are not 
necessary mutually exclusive (see Dungey and Gajurel, 2013), and also with the results of 
Caporin et al. (2013), who, using a Bayesian quantile regression approach to measure contagion, 
obtain that there is no change in the intensity of the transmission of shocks between European 
countries during the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. Accordingly, the common shift 
observed in spreads might be the outcome of the “interdependence” (or “fundamentals-based” 
contagion) that has always been present in the markets. Indeed, recent European events have 
encouraged a new discussion of contagion. Unlike previous crises, in which the country 
responsible for spreading the shock was relatively clear, in the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
several peripheral countries entered a fiscal crisis at roughly the same time. Indeed, when a 
group of countries share an exchange rate agreement (a common currency in the case of the 
euro area countries), crises tend to be clustered. It seems reasonable that, since the economic 
fundamentals of EMU countries are interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, 
services, and capital, other variables beyond herding behaviour or sudden shifts in market 
confidence might also be at the origin of crisis propagation. 
 
Nevertheless, we observe some disparities when analysing crisis transmission from the different 
groups of countries, peripheral or central. In the first case, the empirical evidence shows that, 
with the sole exception of Klose and Weigert (2012)’s index of euro instability, the variables 
that are significant are idiosyncratic (either shifts in market sentiment or in 
macrofundamentals). However in the second, regional market sentiment variables are much 
more relevant. These results suggest that, even though fundamental reasons are still present, 
transmission of the crisis when peripheral countries are the triggers is closer to the definition of 
“pure contagion” than when central countries are the triggers. An abnormal increase in the 
intensity of causal relationships from peripheral to other EMU countries (both peripheral and 
central) is mainly explained by idiosyncratic variables, although spillover effects cannot be 
attributed to herding behaviour alone. Conversely, transmission of the crisis from central 
countries is not only affected by local variables (market sentiment or fundamentals), but also by 
shifts in common regional variables. So, in the latter case, the abnormal increase in the intensity 
of causal relationships can clearly be identified as “fundamentals-based” contagion.   
 
Looking across the columns25, we see that, with regard to the variables measuring local market 
sentiment, we find a positive and significant effect for the stock-market volatility, the index of 
the fiscal stance and the credit rating (as expected, the consumer confidence indicator presents 
                                                          
25 We summarise the results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Table 1 to find evidence for 
particular group of countries of her/his special interest. 
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a negative sign). As for the local macrofundamentals, our results suggest a negative impact on 
contagion for both the net position towards the rest of the world and the market liquidity 
variable, and a positive effect for the country growth potential (proxied by the unemployment 
rate), the competitiveness (captured by the inflation rate) and the fiscal position (measured by 
the debt/GDP or the deficit/GDP ratios). In relation to indicators of regional market 
sentiment, we detect that the credit spread in European corporate bond market plays a decisive 
role in contagion episodes triggered by central countries, while the European 5-year CDS index 
in the financial and non-financial sectors (ITRAXXFIN and ITRAXXNF) are relevant when 
examining all the pair relations and those from central countries. The variable euro instability 
which reflects the market expectation of the probability that at least one euro area country 
would have left the currency union at the end of 2013 is found to be positive and statistically 
significant in all cases, except for pairs relating central to peripheral countries. As regards the 
potential role of financial linkages in the contagion/immunisation episodes, we find a 
significant effect for the variable measuring cross-border banking linkages when analysing the 
whole sample, supporting the close interconnection between the banking and the sovereign 
sectors. 
 
Interestingly, none of variables measuring global market sentiment or regional macroeconomic 
variables was found to be statistically significant. With respect to the latter result, the fact that 
the dependent variable used in the analysis is the yield spread over the German bund might 
have cancelled out all common regional macroeconomic effects that might have adversely 
affected the economic fundamentals of several economies simultaneously, since they may have 
been captured by the evolution of the German yield. As for the global market sentiment, the 
result suggests that shifts in local or regional rather than global market sentiment are behind 
euro area debt crisis transmission. These results are in line with Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2013b) who explore the breakpoints in EMU yield evolution and find that not only are 
half of the breakpoints directly connected to the euro sovereign debt crisis, but that 63% of 
them occur after November 2009 (once Papandreou’s government announced the Greece’s 
distressed  debt position). Additionally, the absence of global market sentiment in the final 
regressions could also suggest that EMU has effectively acted as a true system, in which 
common conditions have had priority over global ones, and where only real differences (at least 
as perceived by market participants) could have explained the dissimilar evolution in sovereign 
yield spreads.  
 
Finally, in Table 1 we also report the McFadden pseudo-R2 statistic as a measure of goodness 
of the fit. As can be seen, it ranges from 0.3012 to 0.4123, suggesting the relative success of the 
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estimated ordered logit regression models in predicting the values of the dependent variable 
within the sample when set against previous work with these models. Note that χ2 and log 
likelihood diagnostic statistics are also satisfactory. As a further test to evaluate how well our 
estimated models account for the observations, in Table 1 we also present the proportion of 
outcomes correctly predicted by the estimated models, denoted as Count R2. As can be seen, it 
ranges from 0.6015 to 0.7005, which can be considered a fairly good result.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have empirically investigated whether the transmission of the recent crisis in 
euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure contagion. To this 
end, we have examined the behaviour of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to 
the German bund for a sample of both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the 
Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) from January 
1999 to December 2012. 
Using daily data, we first applied a dynamic approach to analyse the evolution of the degree of 
Granger-causality within the 90 pairs of sovereign bond yield spreads in our sample. We aimed 
to detect episodes of significantly increased causality between them (which we associate with 
contagion) as well as episodes of significantly reduced interconnection (which we associate with 
immunisation). 
We then used an ordered logit model with monthly data to assess whether a set of variables 
proposed in the theoretical and empirical literature measuring market sentiment (either global, 
regional and local), as well as macrofundamentals (both regional and local) and financial 
linkages have a significant influence in the occurrence of the detected episodes. The findings 
underline the importance of both variables proxying market sentiment and macrofundamentals 
in determining contagion and immunisation outcomes. Therefore, sovereign risk premium 
increase in the euro area during the European sovereign crisis was not due only to deteriorated 
debt sustainability in member countries; nor can it be explained only by herding behaviour or 
sudden shifts in market confidence and expectations. Nevertheless, our analysis highlights the 
relative importance of market participants’ perceptions in episodes triggered by peripheral 
countries, while macroeconomic fundamentals seemed to play a major role in episodes where 
central countries are the triggers.  
  
23
Our results may have some practical implications for investors and policymakers, and may 
provide theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in the behaviour of sovereign debt 
markets. Our methodology can be used as a tool to provide information regarding the factors 
underlying crisis transmission and related risks.  
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables in the ordered logistic 
regressions and data sources 
 
A.1. Variables that measure local market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Returns 
Differences of logged stock indices prices of the last and the 
first day of the month for each country. 
 
Datastream 
 
Stock Volatility 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily returns of each 
country’s stock market general index 
 
Datastream 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) 
This index draws on the frequency of newspaper references to 
policy uncertainty and was created by Baker et al., 2013. 
 
www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
 
This indicator compares a target level of the debt-GDP ratio at 
a given point in the future with a forecast based on the 
government budget constraint.  It was created by Polito and 
Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were linearly interpolated 
from yearly observations for the available data: 1999-2011 
 
 
 
Provided by the authors.  
 
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
  
This index is built up by the European Commission which 
conducts regular harmonised surveys to consumers in each 
country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
Rating 
Credit rating scale built up from Fitch, Moody’s, S&P ratings 
for each country.  
 
Bloomberg 
A.2. Variables that measure regional market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Returns 
Differences of logged stock indices (Eurostoxx-50) prices of 
the last and the first day of the month for each country. 
 
Yahoo-finance 
Stock Volatility (VSTOXX) Eurostoxx-50 implied stock market volatility index. Monthly 
average of daily data. 
 www.stoxx.com 
 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Europe) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(Europe)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were linearly 
interpolated from yearly observations for the available data: 
1999-2011.  
 
Provided by the authors.  
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(Eurozone)  
European Commission  European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
 
Credit Spread 
Difference between the yields of the iBoxx indices 
containing BBB-rated European corporate bonds against the 
yields of the respective iBoxx index of AAA-rated European 
corporate bonds. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
 
Datastream 
 
ITRAXXFIN   
ITRAXXNF 
European 5-year CDS index in the financial and non-
financial sectors: 2010:9-2012:12. 
Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Bloomberg 
 
EIRVIX-1Y 
EIRVIX-10Y 
1-year and 10-year interest rate volatility index for the 
Eurozone based on the implied volatility quotes of caps 
(floors). This index was created by López and Navarro 
(2013) for the period 2004:1-2012:4. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
 
 
Euro Instability 
Market expectation of the probability that at least one Euro 
area country will have left the currency union at the end of 
2013, built up by Klose and Weigert (2012) for the period 
2010:8-2012:8. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
 
Euro area default risk 
Probability of two or more credit events, calculated by Lucas 
et. al. (2013): 2008:1-2012:12 
 
Provided by the authors. 
A.3. Variables that measure global market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Returns Differences of logged stock indices (S&P 500) prices of 
the last and the first day of the month. 
 
Datastream 
 
Stock Volatility (VIX) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility 
Index. (Implied volatility of S&P 500 index options), 
Monthly average of daily data.  
 
Yahoo-Finance 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(United States) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(United States)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data were 
linearly interpolated from yearly observations for the 
available data: 1999-2011 
 
Provided by the authors.  
 
Global Risk Aversion 
The spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US 
swaps and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA 
US corporate bonds. Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Datastream 
 
Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
This measure is based on 11 financial market variables, 
each of which captures one or more key features of 
financial stress. It was created by Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009) 
 
http://www.kansascityfed.org 
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A.4. Variables that measure local macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. Table 18  
 
 
Bank’s debt  
Banks’ debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat  
 
Non-financial 
corporation’s debt  
Non-financial corporations’ debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat 
 
Household’s debt 
Households’ debt-to-GDP of country. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations for the GDP. 
ECB’s Monetary Financial Institutions 
balance sheets and own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from Eurostat 
A.5. Variables that measure regional macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position vis-à-vis  
the rest of the world.  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. Table 18  
 
A.6. Variables that measure financial linkages.  
Variable Description Source 
 
Foreign claims on bank debt 
Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD.  
 
Foreign claims on public  debt  
Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD  
Foreign claims on non-financial 
private debt.  
Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-
to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9C. GDP has been obtained from the 
OECD.   
Cross-border banking linkages 
 
Percentage of the total foreign claims on country 
XX held by country YY's banks  
BIS Consolidated banking statistics. Table 
9D and own estimates. 
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        Figure 2b: Within peripheral countries                                                                      Figure 2c: From peripheral to central countries              
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      Figure 2d: Within central countries                                                                           Figure 2e: From central to peripheral countries 
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Table 1 
 
Notes: In the brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics. 
* and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively 
Count R2 is the proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the model 
XX denotes trigger country and YY receiver country in the pair-wise causal relationship  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
 
 
Variables 
All  
Countries 
Peripheral  
countries 
Peripheral- 
Central 
Countries   
Central 
Countries    
Central-
Peripheral  
countries   
 
 
 
 
 
Local market  
sentiment 
 
 
Stock Volatility 
 
XXStockVol 40.0591* 
(2.2770) 
- - 232.4702* 
(2.2603) 
129.9954* 
(2.3215) 
YYStockVol 110.6452* 
(4.6831) 
- - - 112.6743* 
(2.6441) 
 
Index of the 
Fiscal stance 
XXIFS - - 0.3692* 
(3.2514) 
- 7.2646* 
(4.0722) 
YYIFS 5.2485* 
(3.5523) 
1.6541* 
(4.8106) 
- - 9.2914* 
(3.4619) 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator 
XXCCI - -0.0071* 
(-3.8117) 
- -0.0636* 
(-2.5813) 
-0 .2616* 
(-4.9239) 
YYCCI - - - 0.0857* 
(2.5512) 
- 
 
Rating 
XXRating 0.0848* 
(3.1810) 
0.1693* 
(2.7731) 
 1.0637* 
(6.1112) 
1.5381* 
(3.9901) 
YYRating 0.0936* 
(3.1421) 
0.1135* 
(2.3218) 
-  0.1050* 
(2.2348) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local macro 
fundamentals 
 
Net position 
towards  
the rest of the 
world 
 
 
XXCA 
- -  
 
- 
-0 .4219* 
(-2.9531) 
-0.4478* 
(-2.8938) 
 
Growth potential 
XXU 0.0872* 
(2.7941) 
- - 0 5567* 
(4.2046) 
1.0412* 
(2.3647) 
YYU 0.0755* 
(2.0913) 
0.1316* 
(2.1608) 
- 0.6882* 
(2.9593) 
0.0079* 
(2.4184) 
 
Competitiveness 
XXINF - - - 1.5741* 
(4.2012) 
1.1760* 
(2.3647) 
YYINF - 0.6720* 
(6.6105) 
0 .1228* 
(2.6581) 
- - 
 
 
Fiscal Position 
XXDEBT 0.0198* 
(2.7706) 
- 13.8750* 
(2.8711) 
0.2144* 
(2.7204) 
0. 3124* 
(2.8453) 
YYDEBT 0.0151* 
(3.6103) 
0.0574* 
(4.3457) 
- - 0.0152* 
(2.7915) 
XXDEF 0.0307* 
(2.9341) 
- - - 0.1309* 
(2.4351) 
Market liquidity 
 
XXLIQ - -0.0007* 
(-2.3510) 
- -0 .0122* 
(-2.6392) 
-0.0082* 
(-2.4261) 
YYLIQ -0.0005* 
(-2.8042) 
- - -0 .0113* 
(-3.0032) 
- 
 
 
Regional 
market 
sentiment 
 
Credit Spread EURCreditSpread - - - 0.5759* 
(2.9323) 
0.7639* 
(2.8115) 
ITRAXXFIN EURITRAXXFIN 0.0116* 
(2.1513) 
- - 0 .0706* 
(2.4239) 
0.0169* 
(2.7514) 
ITRAXXNF EURITRAXXNF 0.0407* 
(3.9031) 
- - - 0.1448* 
(2.8941) 
Euro Instability EURInstability 4.8159* 
(3.0452) 
5.9879* 
(2.8215) 
13.8750* 
(3.1422) 
21.5812* 
(2.8635) 
- 
Financial  
Linkages 
Cross-border 
banking linkages 
XXYYBAN 0.0341* 
(3.0541) 
- - - - 
Individual dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies NO YES YES YES NO 
Pseudo R2 0.3993 0.3535 0.3012 0.3733 0.4123 
Count R2 0.6015 0.6554 0.6490 0.7065 0.6552 
Log likelihood -992.8748 -579.6895 -540.0211 -259.3379 -226.4079 
χ2 601.76* 639.22* 298.30* 176.34* 200.01* 
Prob individual dummies = 0 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Prob time dummies = 0 0.8721 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0458** 0.1558 
Prob individual dummies  
and time dummies = 0 
- 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* - 
Observations 1408 864 1200 560 368 
Countries 90 20 25 20 25 
